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Aron Winter reverted to a 4-2-3-1 shape for this crucial Champions League match, abandoning the 3-4-3 formation he’d been using in recent weeks to some degree of success. Meanwhile, FC Dallas lined up in their familiar fluid formation where the only real constants were the back four with Daniel Hernandez just ahead of them and Andrew Jacobson providing additional support. Their front four was extremely fluid and it almost makes no sense to try and label them in a diagram.
Via: http://this11.com/
No secret to Dallas’ style
Hyndman has developed a pretty consistent style with Dallas over the past couple of years and this match was no different. His team likes to keep their defensive line deep and use their captain, Hernandez, as the out ball. Hernandez is the initiator of their attacks and he likes to spread the ball wide quickly to Dallas’ quick, creative players in the form of Marvin Chavez, Jackson, and Brek Shea. They also commit men forward on set pieces and try to take advantage of Hernandez’s ability to flight in a free kick, even if the ball is near half.
Defensively, like mentioned in the previous paragraph, Dallas likes to sit deep. Usually you associate a deeper defensive line with less pressing. If you press high with a deep defensive line it usually opens up a lot of space in midfield as there is a huge gap between your back four and your attackers. However, Dallas pressed Toronto fairly high up the pitch. It also allows for Hernandez, Dallas’ key playmaker, to have a lot of the pitch in order to find himself space.
Phases of attack for TFC
This meant that when Toronto had the ball at the back they usually had to hit the ball out quickly, goalkeeper Milos Kocic forced into a number of long balls from back passes. The deep line of Dallas, and the generally poor distribution from Kocic, meant that instead of their centre backs attacking the long balls it was their central midfielders. Usually this is not ideal as your central defensive pairing is usually the best in the air, but Dallas employs two very tall midfielders as part of their double pivot and so, relatively speaking, they were comfortable with Hernandez and Jacobson battling with Toronto’s midfielders in the air rather than having George John and Ugo Ihemelu face Danny Koevermans. To illustrate this point, Jacobson and Hernandez combined for 19 aerial challenges while John and Ihemelu only combined for 11. As a reference point, Torsten Frings and Julian de Guzman only had 5 headers while Ty Harden and Andy Iro combined for 11.
That was Toronto’s first phase in their attack. If TFC did gain possession of the ball in the large midfield space afforded by Dallas, the home side then had to deal with Toronto’s second phase. They did this by dropping their midfielders back and becoming very compact. This gave Toronto a problem as to how to open up Dallas. They couldn’t play balls over the top because Dallas was playing deep with a tall, physical shield in front of them, and when they tried to be deliberate Dallas packed men behind the ball and attempted to counter.
Break through comes from Dallas’ set piece
That’s not to say Toronto was devoid of chances. Individual factors come into play, no matter the tactics. Joao Plata was dominating Jeremy Hall during the opening of the first half and if not for some poor decision making Toronto would have scored earlier. However, Plata was afforded a lot of time and space to attack after a Dallas free kick. The ball wasn’t all that close to Toronto’s box but Dallas sent men forward to attack Hernandez’s delivery. Toronto defended it and got the ball forward quickly. Nick Soolsma laid it off to de Guzman who spread the ball beautifully to Plata. The Ecuadorian was left one on one with Hall and he made a good decision to attack him and cut the ball back into a dangerous area where Koevermans eventually applied the finish. One of the major sources of Dallas’ attacks had led to them conceding a goal.
Dallas have difficulty responding
The one inherent problem with Dallas FC’s style is that it is not conducive to chasing a game. If a team is beating you then they have no impetus to push forward and commit men into your area. This means that if you rely on countering and giving your skilled players time and space you won’t be able to exploit any space behind your opponents. Jackson looked very lively, chasing balls over top of Toronto’s defense and running the channels, but generally Toronto didn’t need to concede a lot of space behind them.
After half time Dallas played higher up the pitch, but not a whole lot higher. Their strategy remained similar to the first half, after all they still only needed one goal and they had some great individual players that could create chances. However, with time starting to tick down Hyndman subbed out Hall for Ruben Luna. Almost immediately Toronto exploited the new found space at the back and scored their second goal.
Toronto wins individual battles
A large reason Dallas weren’t able to create much was because Ryan Johnson was marking Hernandez. The Dallas captain is his team’s out ball, meaning when they have possession at the back they look to him first. He has the ability to find space and then pick out accurate forward passes. However, Johnson seemed to have an instruction to basically man mark him. He was perfectly set up as the attacking midfielder, a role he doesn’t usually play for TFC. This isn’t the first time Winter has played someone in a specific position high up the pitch to close down a deep lying playmaker. Tony Tchani was used in a similar role in Toronto’s away draw against the LA Galaxy. Although Johnson was playing the number 10 role he didn’t create much until Dallas’ substitution, however his defensive work was a key factor in the opening hour.
Dallas’ other danger man, undoubtedly, is Shea. He was deployed high up the pitch on the left wing and was locked in a one on one battle with teenager Doneil Henry for most of the night. While the match up seems to obviously favour Shea over the inexperienced Henry, the young Canadian actually matched up well with the American international. Henry is a good man marker and having the task of marking Shea specifically made it easier for him to know where to be and what to do. Shea is large and strong for a winger and often over powers opposition full backs, and he loves to knock the ball past his opponent. The problem for him was that Henry is also large and strong, and powerful enough to play in central defense. His athleticism and height allowed him to go toe to toe with Shea and gave him a chance to recover is Shea ever got the better of him.
Winter remains calm
After Toronto went one-nil up the onus was on Hyndman to make a change to get back into to the match. He tried to, but immediately went down another goal. At this point no one would have blamed Winter for pushing Frings back into defense as a sweeper, but the Dutchman kept the team the same and dared his side to keep playing the way they had – imaginative and attacking. Toronto began conceding possession as Dallas became more proactive, but they still looked dangerous. Dallas were disjointed, their players became individuals and tried to get themselves back into the match on their own, perfectly summed up by Jackson needlessly losing the ball to Plata who finished the game off. It was only then that Winter moved Frings back but the game was over.
Conclusion
Initially Toronto had a little trouble breaking down the hosts, but Plata’s individual ability meant they were knocking on the door before finally opening it. Johnson neutralized Hernandez, Henry dealt with Shea, and the Toronto back four dealt with Dallas’ attackers by defending a little deeper and denying the space behind them. Julian de Guzman had a fantastic match in the middle and every player played above average for the Reds. Say what you will about this being the ‘biggest match ever’ – it was Toronto FC’s best played and coached match ever.
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